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Abstract: Over the past decade, an amazing trend has taken
hold across the country-municipalities have begun
providing Internet access to themselves and their citizens.
Many areas of the United States, rural areas especially, are
being left without privately provided Internet access. Those
areas might consider a municipally-controlled alternative
to private Internet service providers to prevent being left
behind as the Internet increasingly becomes the means in
which society communicates, participates, and influences.
While benefits abound when municipalities provide Internet
access, not every municipality should do so. Factual
circumstances change from city to city. Many are, or can
be, served adequately by private service providers, and that
should be a consideration. Municipalities considering
providing their own network should look to case studies to
gain important insight. This article provides a small
sampling of case studies that could provide such insight.
This article will detail the stories offive municipal networks
and deduce lessons they can teach us. First, three "success"
stories will be discussed: Bristol, Va., Corpus Christi, Tex.,
and Santa Monica, Cal. A discussion of the unsuccessful
stories in Philadelphia, Pa., and St. Cloud, Fla. will
follow. From these cases, lessons regarding business models
and growth of the network can be gleaned. Both of these
lessons are important to comprehend when determining
whether to pursue a municipal broadband network, and
both could cause the demise of the network if not handled
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carefully. After reading these case studies and giving the
issues discussed herein full attention, municipalities can
avoid repeating the same mistakes as before.
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it.
-George Santayana
I. INTRODUCTION
Municipalities are an increasingly powerful force in the Internet
access market. It goes without saying that Internet access can be the
gateway to prosperity-the Internet provides a forum for democratic
participation, education, local and national news, commerce, and
other vital aspects of a functioning society and economy.' Indeed,
infrastructure over which citizens access the Internet is increasingly
being called essential-"an essential element of most economic
activities around the world."2 Where private providers fail (for lack of
service, low quality service, slow access speeds, among other reasons),
city governments often have the ability to provide that service in order
to meet local needs.3 Moreover, city government ownership over the
network means the city controls the reins, can oversee the network,
and can ensure that the network embodies the government's vision,
including subscription rates, upgrades, and network neutrality. In that
respect, municipalities have increasingly begun to experiment with
providing high-speed Internet access for themselves and for their
constituents.4
1 BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 317-
18, 336 (2012).
2 E.g., Fernando Beltran et al., Internet as Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from the
Backbone Experience in South America, 58 COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES 1, 2 (2005).
3 FED. COMM. COMM'N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 153 (Apr.
8, 2011), http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf. This issue
often evokes comparisons to the early 2 0 th century when private electric companies left
rural areas without power. See id.; Edwin B. Parker, Closing the Digital Divide in Rural
America, 24 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL. 281, 282 (2000).
4 Glasgow, Ky. was the first to create such a network in 1989. Steven C. Carlson, A
Historical, Economic, and LegalAnalysis of Municipal Ownership of the Information
Highway, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 7-8 (1999). For a detailed look at Bristol,
Va., Chattanooga, Tenn., and Lafayette, La.'s success with their municipal networks, see
CHRISTOPHER MITCHELL, BROADBAND AT THE SPEED OF LIGHT (Apr. 2012), http://www.ilsr.
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/muni-bb-speed-light.pdf.
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There are several benefits to municipal provision of high-speed
Internet access: local governments often need their own high-speed
Internet access to provide other services to citizens and for internal
operations; it can lead to significant economic development; and it
can overcome the digital divide by providing universal service to all.5
With these benefits, perhaps even the most expensive municipal
broadband plan may be worth the investment. 6
The accretion of municipal networks is not a coincidence. The
communications marketplace has exhibited tremendous growth, but
also tremendous consolidation as more and more subscribers have
fewer and fewer choices for Internet service providers.7 While this
consolidation occurred, (both wired access and wireless access), two
concomitant problems have taken place: first, rural areas are being
ignored, almost completely, by private high-speed Internet providers
(the "rural build-out problem"); and second, even some urban and
densely populated areas have slow connections running on old
technology.8
The rural build-out problem is significant. Put simply, the Internet
access market can be described as a "natural" monopoly because of its
high barriers to entry (up-front costs of building infrastructure) and
a Frangois Bar & Namkee Park, Municipal Wi-FiNetworks: The Goals, Practices, and
Policy Implications of the U.S. Case, 61 COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES 107, 111 (2006);
Benjamin Lennett, From the Digital Divide to Digital Excellence, NEW AM. FOUND. (Feb. 1,
2011), http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/from the digital divide to digital
excellence; "The Digital Divide refers to the gap between those who can benefit from digital
technology and those that cannot." Craig Warren Smith, "DigitalDivide"Defined, DIGITAL
DIVIDE INST. (July 6, 2012), http://www.digitaldivide.org/digital-divide/
digitaldividedefined/digitaldivide.
6 The terms "high-speed Internet" and "broadband" will be used interchangeably unless
noted otherwise.
7 SUSAN P. CRAWFORD, CAFFIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND MONOPOLY POWER
IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2013); Susan P. Crawford, The Communications Crisis in
America, 5 HARV. L. & POL. REV. 245, 248-9 (2011).
8 While cable broadband has majority market share, see Om Malik, In U.S. Broadband,
Cable is Eating the Bells' Lunch, GIGAOM (July 31, 2012), http://gigaom.com/2012/07/31/
in-u-s-broadband-cable-is-eating-the-bells-lunch, a fiber-only architecture is "the only
last-mile technology capable of meeting ultra high-speed needs.... [P]ushing fiber deeper
into the network puts into place an infrastructure that has long-term strategic benefits."
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, THE BROADBAND AVAILABILITY GAP 76 (April
2010), available at http://download.broadband.gov/plan/the-broadband-availability-gap-
obi-technical-paper-no-i.pdf.
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declining marginal costs of adding new customers.9 With high up-
front costs, private providers are wary of building expensive
infrastructure to serve rural areas where there is only a limited
opportunity to recoup those costs. 10 Rural areas are generally
unattractive to private providers because with only a few hundred to a
few thousand potential subscribers, it would take a substantial
amount of time to see a return on that investment. Many private
companies are short-term, profit-driven entities, and therefore,
infrastructure build-out to rural areas is less likely to happen.11 This
leaves many rural areas without much-needed high-speed Internet
access. To solve that problem, municipalities are building their own
networks.
The second problem mentioned above is that even urban and
densely populated areas in the United States have slow access speeds.
Recently, the United States ranked seventeenth in advertised
broadband speeds among OECD countries.12 While other areas of the
world are being hooked up to fiber-to-the-home systems, 13 the United
States, in many areas, is still beholden to the cable companies and
their slow, out-of-date copper lines.14 This means that as innovation at
the edges of the Internet increasingly requires high-speed Internet
access (video streaming websites such as YouTube and NetFlix, for
9 STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 446-47 (2d ed.
2oo6); see also Mike Masnick, Network Neutrality and Natural Monopolies, TECHDIRT
(Jan. 16, 2006, 10:28 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/2oo6o116/1o282o5.shtml.
This characterization is up for debate, however; But see Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Myth of
Natural Monopoly, MISES INST. (May 13, 2011), http://mises.org/daily/5266.
10 See Parker, supra note 3, at 282. Rural areas lack "economies of scale" due to their small
market sizes.
ii Mitchell, supra note 4, at 50.
12 OECD, Average Advertised Download Speeds by Country, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION &
DEV. (Sept. 2011), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1O/53/39575o86.xls.
13 It is happening in Hong Kong, see Randall Stross, Cheap, Ultrafast Broadband? Hong
Kong Has It, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/o6/business/
o6digi.html, Japan, Germany, and many others. Om Malik, So Where Else in the World
Can You Get 1 Gbps to the Home?, GIGAOM (Feb. 11, 2010, 6:00 PM), http://gigaom.com/
2010/02/11/so-where-else-in-the-world-can-you-get-1-gbps-to-the-home.
14 Verizon FiOS is a 100% fiber-optic network, but plans to expand are non-existent and it
currently covers only 14% of the United States. Karl Bode, Verizon Again Confirms FiOS
Expansion Is Over, DSLREPORTS (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/
Verizon-Again-Confirms-FiOS-Expansion-is-Over-118949.
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example), those lacking the necessary connection will be left behind
culturally, economically, and democratically.
Whether a municipality should provide its own broadband will
require a fact-specific determination made after serious inquiry into
many important issues.15 In some instances, private Internet access
providers satisfy most or all of the needs of its subscribers, including
the municipality itself. Other times, private actors do not suffice.
While the task of understanding how to begin planning a municipal
broadband network may be "daunting,"16 case studies can be a vital
tool. There are important lessons to be learned from previous
successful and failed attempts.
A municipality's success depends on a variety of factors. For
instance, municipalities should be ready to respond to incumbents
that fight mercilessly against any municipal broadband plan both in
the courts and in the legislature. 17 Also, depending on how the
municipality chooses to run the network, it should be prepared to
interact with customers on a personalized basis, including for
technical and business issues. While these issues (and others) present
challenges to municipalities, empirical data show that municipalities
can be very successful Internet providers. While some have met with
problems, many have overcome them.
This paper will detail five municipal broadband case studies.
While this is only a small cross-section of municipal broadband plans,
these studies have lessons embedded within them that can provide
important guidance for other municipalities.18 First, three "success"
1s Some states, such as Virginia and Wisconsin, even require this study bylaw, called a
"feasibility study." James Baller, State Restrictions on Public Communications Initiatives
(as ofJuly 1, 2012), BALLER HERBST GRP. (July 1, 2012), http://baller.com/pdfs/
BallerHerbstStateBarriers%287-1-12%29.pdf. However, one should be careful to avoid the
trap of "study after study." They can be expensive and tell you information you already
know. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 55.
16 Angsana Techatassanasoontorn et al., Learning Processes in Municipal Broadband
Projects: An Absorptive Capacity Perspective, 34 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL. 572, 584
(2010).
17 See generally Eric Null, Legal and Political Challenges to Municipal Networks in the
United States, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMMUNITY WIRELESS NETWORKS AND
INFRASTRUCTURES 38-42 (Abdelnasser Abdelaal ed. 2013).
18 This paper will not give a fine-grained analysis detailing specific steps municipalities
should follow. For that, see Breitbart, infra note 114, at 31-3, MITCHELL, supra note 4, at
54-60, and NULL, supra note 17, at 42-44. Additionally, it should be noted that wireless
and wired technologies are different, and both have their own quirks. This article will
largely ignore the technical means by which municipalities provide Internet access, and
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stories will be discussed: Bristol, Va., Corpus Christi, Tex., and Santa
Monica, Cal. Next, the article will discuss the unsuccessful attempts at
broadband networks in Philadelphia, Pa., and St. Cloud, Fla.
Thereafter, this article will discuss the important lessons learned from
these networks, including what they teach about business models and
how to properly build-out the network.
II. SUCCESS STORIES
A. Bristol, Va.
In 1999, Bristol's phone provider, Bristol Virginia Utilities (BVU),
built optical fiber connections for internal government use (so-called
"I-nets") in response to a severe storm that shut the utility down.19 As
fiber-optic demand increased among local businesses and BVU
realized additional capacity was available at a low cost, BVU expanded
the program and began offering service for outside businesses.2o In
2002, BVU expanded even further to provide home Internet service to
Bristol citizens. As demand for the network increased, it quickly grew
to eight counties to the north (the "Virginia Coalfield region"),
encompassing a total of 250 miles of fiber backbone and 675 total
miles of fiber plant infrastructure.21 Like some other cities, BVU's
offerings allow consumers to choose between multiple plans,
including a triple-play package, which encompasses telephone, cable
television (including Video-on-Demand), and broadband Internet.2 2 If
a customer chooses to subscribe only to broadband Internet, BVU
offers different speeds and prices.23 The wired service also powers free
will simply refer to all networks as "municipal broadband networks" unless otherwise
specified.
19 MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 3.
20 Id.
21 Bradley Kramer, Pioneering Spirit: Bristol, Va., Trailblazing Muni FTTH, METASWITCH
22 (Mar. 2008), http://www.metaswitch.com/sites/default/files/case-study-bvu.pdf.
22 Municipal FITH Deployment Snapshot - City ofBristol, Virginia, BVUOptiNet,
BROADBAND COMMUNITIES MAG. ONLINE, Aug.-Sept. 2008, http://www.bbpmag.com/
snapshot/snapoo2.php. For a list of municipalities offering triple-play packages, see
Municipal Broadband Systems Offering Triple Play, AM. PUBLIC POWER ASSOC. (Dec.
2011), http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/MunicipalBondTriplePlay.pdf.
23 Andy Opsahl, Municipal Broadband Efforts Succeed Despite Wi-Fi Meltdown, Gov.
TECH. (Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.govtech.com/pcio/Municipal-Broadband-Efforts-
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Wi-Fi at Bristol's local mall and in local government buildings. That
Wi-Fi signal, in some instances, reaches homes.24 Seventy percent of
Bristol's residents and businesses, or approximately 11,750 people,
subscribe to the network.25
The city originally invested $21 million in the network through
bonds and federal grants. It is expected to pay for itself in twelve to
fifteen years.26 Bristol has already seen significant direct benefits.27
Large companies, including Northrop Grumman and CGI, have moved
to nearby Lebanon, Va., in part because of BVU's one gigabit-per-
second service.23 These two companies alone brought 70o high-paying
jobs to southwestern Virginia, with thirty percent of those positions
being filled by local residents.29 Moreover, BVU's services have been
Succeed-Despite-Wi-Fi.html. For a list of tiers and prices for residential plans, see
Residential High-Speed Internet, BVU, http://www.bvu-optinet.com/templates/
default.php?purl=internet res hispeed&turl=inside_3colstd template.htm (last visited
Jan. 11, 2013).
24 Opsahl, supra note 23.
25 MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 3.
26 Opsahl, supra note 23. The Virginia Tobacco Commission helped fund the program.
Infinera Case Study: BVU, INFINERA 1 (2010), http://www.infinera.com/broadband/
files/cs-bvu.pdf. While there were some debt-related problems early-on, those problems
have been largely handled. BVU is currently $24 million in debt, but ran in the black earlier
than expected, and has a $2.3 million rainy day fund. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 7-10.
27 This was apparently the goal: "BVU management was very conscious of the fact that the
southwestern Virginia area was suffering from the decline of the local coalmining industry,
rural poverty, and depopulation. They saw [fiber to the user] as a technology that could
turn the region around and attract people and new industries." Infinera Case Study: BVU,
supra note 26.
28 The Advantages ofOptical Access, FTTH COUNCIL 28 (Spring 2011), http://s.ftthcouncil.
org/files/bbp marapr primer - 2011.pdf. Northrop Grumman called BVU's investment
"critical" to its decision. It also cited local universities and low cost of living as important.
Fibre in Paradise, ECONOMIST (London) (Feb. 18, 20o), http://www.economist.com/
node/15549324?story id=15549324. Interestingly, Northrop Grumman required BVU to
upgrade its network before agreeing to move. Infinera Case Study, supra note 26, at 1.
29 MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 15; Infinera Case Study, supra note 26, at 3. Wes
Rosenbalm, BVU CEO, stated the "average annual salary at the new data centers is around
$50,000, compared with average per-capita income in the region of $20,000 (roughly half
the US average)." Id.
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instrumental in business retention. The coal giant, Alpha Natural
Resources, stayed in Bristol partially because of BVU's service.30
BVU is embarking on an ambitious two-and-a-half year project to
expand the network.31 The goal is a 388-mile fiber network that will
serve the greater Southwestern Virginia area with fiber that can reach
ten gigabits-per-second.32 The expansion will enable the network to
reach 120 anchor institutes such as "schools, libraries, hospitals,
clinics, major government facilities and other large public facilities."33
It will also make last-mile service possible for 18,ooo homes and 500
businesses. The project is funded by the 2009 stimulus bill for over
$22 million and more than $5 million from the Virginia Tobacco
Commission.34 Currently, the city has invested or received in grants
approximately $80 million for the project.35
Increasing the number of jobs and the median pay in the area is a
tremendous economic benefit, but social benefits abound as well. The
Wellmont Health System uses the network for its "cardiac tele-health
system." The tele-health system allows patients in any of eight health
centers to send, via network connection, x-rays and other test results
to experts in the Tennessee Medical Center. With that information,
doctors and patients can video conference without the need to
30 James Lardner, Wave of the Future?, REMAPPING DEBATE 1-2 (May 25, 2011), http://
www.remappingdebate.org/sites/all/files/Wave%200f%2othe%2ofuture_1.pdf.
31 Charles Owens, Stimulus Funding to Stretch Broadband Through 8 Va. Counties,
BLUEFIELD DAILY TELEGRAPH (July 3, 2010), http://bdtonline.com/local/x1671038o13/
Stimulus-funding-to-stretch-broadband-through-8-Va-counties. Though, BVU has been
expanding and upgrading the network since inception. See, e.g., Connecting Rhythm &
Rooters, BVUPDATE MAG. (Fall 2011), http://www.bvu-optinet.com/data-elements/
BVUUpdateFall2o11 web.pdf.
32 Eric Slack, Bristol Virginia Utilities: Constant Change, ENERGY TODAY MAG. (July 1,
2011), http://www.energytodaymagazine.com/index.php?option=com-content&view=
article&id=7255:bristol-virginia-utilities-constant-change&catid=151:utilities-generation-
transmission&Itemid=195.
33 Christopher Mitchell, Bristol Gets Stimulus Funds for Middle Mile and Starts Smart
Grid, MUNINETWORKS (July 14, 20o), http://www.muninetworks.org/content/bristol-
gets-stimulus-funds-middle-mile-and-starts-smart-grid (quoting former United States
Representative Frederick Boucher).
34 Id.
3a MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 2.
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transport patients between hospitals. 36 The hospitals even use
municipal Internet access as a selling point to its potential
employees.37
Increased localism is another social benefit. BVU employs local
citizens. Thus, when BVU subscribers call seeking customer support,
they know they are speaking to a fellow local citizen who actually cares
about solving the problem.38 This means municipalities can avoid the
general distaste and distrust of the telecommunications industry-six
of the fifteen most disliked companies in the United States are
telecommunications companies.39 This gives a competitive advantage
to municipalities. BVU has spared no expense training its employees
too. It houses a 24/7 call center and, over nine months, has "cross-
train[ed] all of its customer service representatives in broadband,
cable television, and telephone services in addition to the usual utility
services with which they were already familiar. . ."40
Lastly, as mentioned above, the wired connection powers a free
Wi-Fi service that reaches government buildings, the local mall, and
some residents.41 Free Wi-Fi service is not just convenient; it can help
bridge the digital divide by allowing lower income individuals to
access the Internet for free, it can increase student access and
learning, and it can reduce residential telecommunications costs.
Additionally, some areas in southwestern Virginia would be without
4G signals if it were not for BVU.42
36 Infinera Case Study, supra note 26, at 3-4. This system benefits low-income patients by
saving them travel costs, but also brings "expertise ... to areas that do not have that
expertise." Id. at 4.
37 Id. at 4.
38 Kramer, supra note 21, at 24.
39 Dina Spector, Gus Lubin & Vivian Giang, The 15Most Disliked Companies in America,
Bus. INSIDER (June 22, 2012, 1:41 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-most-hated-
companies-in-america-2012-6?op=1 (increasing in hatred: DirecTV, CenturyLink, Cox
Communications, Time Warner Cable, Comcast, Charter Communications). It should be
noted that municipal utilities have topped the list (Northeast Utilities, Long Island Power
Authority). However, Bristol and Chattanooga have both overcome such dislike by offering
quality service.
40 MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 11.
41 Opsahl, supra note 23.
42 MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 13.
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The municipal broadband program in Bristol is known for its
success. 43 BVU's CEO, Wes Rosenbalm, attributes its success to
fulfilling a community need rather than seeking novelty.44 Because
private companies were not likely to build high-speed Internet
infrastructure in Bristol of their own volition, the primary viable actor
available to meet that community need was the municipality itself.45
Success did not come without a fight. BVU was subject to
numerous legal battles. Incumbents fought "tooth and nail" to stop
BVU.4 6 Bristol incurred an unexpected $2.5 million in legal fees.47
Virginia law, as of 2001, prevented municipalities from providing
telecommunications services.48 BVU sued the state and won, repealing
the law. After, BVU successfully worked with the legislature to pass a
bill that affirmatively gave Bristol the ability to provide telecom
services. 49 BVU then had its service launch delayed by Charter
Communications, the cable TV incumbent, when Charter sought and
won an injunction preventing BVU from supplying its fiber service.
Virginia legislators again saved the utility by passing a law explicitly
authorizing BVU to offer cable TV services.50 Sprint, a telephone
incumbent, filed a petition with the Virginia State Corporation
Commission seeking to preclude BVU from offering phone services
43 It was the only U.S. city listed on the Intelligent Community Forum's list of Top Seven
Intelligent Communities of 2009. Id. In addition, Bristol also won the 2008 Last Mile
Smart Community Award for municipalities with fewer than 200,000 people. Kramer,
supra note 21, at 22. Last Mile magazine does not exist anymore.
44 Opsahl, supra note 23.
45 Id.
46 David Chaffee & Mitchell Shapiro, MUNICIPAL & UTILITY GUIDEBOOK TO BRINGING
BROADBAND FIBER OPTICS TO YOUR COMMUNITY, PUB. TECH. INST., 18 (2oo8), http://
www.pti.org/docs-cio/Municipal&UtilityGuidebook.PDF.
47 MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 4.
48 CHAFFEE, supra note 46, at 19.
49 Id.
5o Id. Unfortunately, that bill also erected barriers for any other municipality to build its
own network, and merely grandfathered Bristol in. Baller, supra note 15, at 4.
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because Sprint thought BVU was subsidizing its telephone rates.51 The
Commission denied Sprint's request.5 2
Despite tremendous opposition, BVU was able to grow from a
utility providing network services to the municipality to a multi-
faceted utility providing the city of Bristol with a competitive option
for wired and wireless broadband, cable TV, and telephone.53 The
option has kept businesses from moving out of the city, has brought
new business, and has been recognized for its success. Bristol created
an organization called FOCUS (Finding Opportunities for
Communities throughout the United States), "a business unit offering
advanced IT consulting, operations and management services to
municipal entities globally."54 Not only can other municipalities learn
from Bristol's case study, but they can contact FOCUS for consultation
services.
B. Corpus Christi, Tex.
Corpus Christi is home to 300,000 people.55 Its plan to provide
free Wi-Fi to the entire city was ambitious. The city's hard work
resulted in a plan that, at one time, was heralded as the most
successful municipal wireless program.56 After a meter reader was
attacked by a dog, the city decided it needed a new way to read
meters.57 In 2002, the city invested $7.1 million in a 147-square-mile
a5 MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 4.
52 CHAFFEE, supra note 46, at 19. However, as part of the deal, BVU needed to provide
studies to the Commission to prove its prices complied with state law. Id.
as For a comparison of BVU, Charter, and Sprint's subscription rates for cable and
telephone (respectively), see MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 5. One can see that in almost every
category, BVU's prices were lower than the incumbent's. Even where they were not,
"OptiNet customers said it would take a big swing in prices to make them switch back to
Charter." Id. at 6.
54 Press Release, Bristol Virginia Utilities Launches New Business Unit, Announces First
Customer, Aug. 16, 2007, available at http://www.accessbristolva.com/images/o81607
FOCUS-press.pdf.
55 Kristina Dell, Welcome to Wi-Fi-Ville, TIME MAGAZINE (Jan. 5, 2007), http://www.
time.com/time/magazine/article/o,9171,1574164,oo.html.
56 Steven Titch, Corpus Christi Shows Way to Muni Success, HEARTLANDER (Nov. 1, 2007),
http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2007/ 11/0 I/corpus-christi-shows-way-
muni-success [hereinafter Titch, Corpus Christi].
57 Dell, supra note 55.
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mesh Wi-Fi network. 58 It was originally designed to allow the
municipality to read power meters electronically. 59 At the time,
EarthLink was interested in partnering with municipalities to provide
wireless service to consumers. 60 It bought the mesh Wi-Fi system
from Corpus Christi for $5.2 million (to be paid in two installments)
hoping to monetize the network through subscription Internet
services. 61 EarthLink offered service for $20 per month.62 However,
within a few years EarthLink learned that it could not profit from this
business model. In 2008, it gave the system back to Corpus Christi
with $2.5 million in enhancements and equipment. In return, Corpus
Christi abated the second installment payment. 63 This left the city with
a vastly improved network that it could now use for its own
purposes. 64
58 Opsahl, supra note 23. In a typical wireless network, centralized routers propagate
signals, and those within range receive the signal and also propagate it. Mesh wireless
networks create mini-routers out of each individual device on the network. Christian
Sandvig, Spectrum Miscreants, Vigilantes, and Kangaroo Courts: The Return of the
Wireless Wars, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 481, 491 n.44 (2011).
59 Heather Clancy, Corpus Christi Pushes Envelope with Municipal Wireless,
SMARTPLANET (July 28, 2010, 5:19 AM), http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/business-
brains/corpus-christi-pushes-envelope-with-municipal-wireless/8863 (Corpus Christi's
wireless system is second only to Oklahoma City in size).
60 EarthLink partnered with various municipalities, including Philadelphia and Corpus
Christi, but pulled out of the market entirely in 2008. Shane McGlaun, Municipal Wi-Fi
Failing, EarthLink Pulls Out, DAILYTECH (Mar. 24, 2008, 2:20 PM), http://www.dailytech.
com/Municipal+WiFi+Failing+Earthlink+Pulls+Out/article1211.htm.
61 Opsahl, supra note 23. The first installment was $3.5 million, and the second installment
was $1.7 million. Id.
62 Kristin Kloberdanz, Whither Municipal Wi-Fi?, FASTCOMPANY (Apr. 2, 2008), http://
www.fastcompany.com/magazine/124/whither-municipal-wi-fi.html.
63 Opsahl, supra note 23. The city netted $8oo,ooo from the deal ($2.5 million in new
equipment minus $1.7 million it was owed for the network on the second installment).
64 John Sendejar, general manager of ConnectCC, the city's Wi-Fi program, described it as
"a pretty sweet deal." Id. But he has also described it as "unceremonious[]," especially
given the lack of coherent organization or ability to oversee the operation. Sendejar was not
able to determine what equipment worked and did not work, and the only documentation
he received was a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet with 130o access points listed on it. Susan
Nunziata, Mesh Network Is Key to Corpus Christi's Mobile Worker Program, MOBILE
ENTERPRISE (Mar. 4, 2009), http://mobileenterprise.edgl.com/top-stories/Mesh-Network-
Is-Key-To-Corpus-Christi-s-Mobile-Worker-Program6o556.
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Originally, the city did not view its primary goal as bridging the
digital divide, nor was the city interested in providing service to
people's homes. 65 It was one piece of a much larger city-wide
information technology overhaul. It was designed to increase
efficiency by improving services and cutting costs by "migrating time-
and paper-intensive work to a wireless network."66 In other words, it
was designed to avoid dog bites.
The city wanted to align agency interests (police, fire, education,
and licensing) such that a single network could meet their business
needs. 67 John Sendejar, now General Manager of ConnectCC, the
company in charge of the city's Wi-Fi program, went "department by
department to see where [the city could] increase productivity by
using the . . . network."68 The city's plan for meter reading required
only ten percent of the network's total capacity.69 Ninety percent of
the capacity was leftover for other uses. To ensure the network would
be used in the public interest, the city founded the Corpus Christi
Digital Community Development Corporation (CCDCDC), a non-
profit group that
primarily looks to develop e-government applications
that give the Wi-Fi network and Internet connectivity
broader appeal across larger portions of the population.
While this may include free connectivity and training, it
also involves ways to make it easier for citizens to work
with city government, such as using Web applications
to fill out forms that would otherwise require a trip
downtown, file theft reports, pay taxes and fees, and
perform other transactions.70
65 Titch, Corpus Christi, supra note 56.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Press Release, Tropos Networks, City of Corpus Christi Extends Tropos Wireless
Broadband Network to Improve Traffic Management and Public Safety During Spring
Break (Mar. 30, 2010), available at http://www.tropos.com/news/pressreleases/
3_30_2010.php.
69 Clancy, supra note 59.
70Titch, Corpus Christi, supra note 56. The CCDCDC has since been renamed "ConnectCC."
For more information, visit http://www.connectcc.com.
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The network is now used for much more than just meter reading.
It is used for tracking emergency vehicles to find the closest unit to an
emergency and sending architectural plans wirelessly to computers in
fire trucks to aid firefighters and increase their safety.71 Even more
fine-grained information can be provided, such as the exact location of
firefighters inside burning buildings, monitoring the amount of air left
in firefighters' air tanks, or the ability to stream video from the scene
of an emergency.72 The network is also used for monitoring traffic and
public safety (via wireless video cameras) during Corpus Christi's busy
spring break.73 There are at least thirty cameras, with plans to increase
that number to 150. The city planned to use the network to track
evacuees in the event of a hurricane, a troubling danger for a coastal
city.74 Similarly, the cameras were used (unexpectedly, at the time) to
track the progress of Hurricane Alex in June 2010.75 The city also
upgraded the wireless equipment to provide Wi-Fi signals to beach-
goers.76 As of 2010, there were at least thirty hot-spots in the city.77 In
71 Steven Titch, Municipal Wireless Supports Corpus Christi's Public Safety, SECURITY
PRODUCTS (Oct. 23, 2007), http://seeprodonline.com/articles/2007/10/23/municipal-
wireless-supports.aspx [hereinafter Titch, Municipal Wireless].
72 Id. For more potential uses, including wireless transmission for restaurant inspectors,
utility workers, water crews, and a hot-spot at the local sports arena, see Nunziata, supra
note 64.
73 Esme Vos, Corpus Christi, Texas Muni Wi-Fi Welcomes Spring Break, MUNIWIRELESS
(Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.muniwireless.com/2010/03/3o/corpus-christi-muni-wifi-
welcomes-spring-break. Corpus Christi is a popular spring break destination because of its
plentiful beaches. The program appears to have been a success. Tropos Press Release,
supra note 68.
74 Titch, Municipal Wireless, supra note 71.
75 Clancy, supra note 59 ("[W]hen Hurricane Alex was brewing in the Gulf, the city realized
the cameras could be used for another purpose: to track the progress of the hurricane.").
There were only six cameras at that time. Id. However, with increased municipally-
sponsored surveillance, other problems, such as privacy and freedom of information, have
become evident. See generally E. Casey Lide, Balancing the Benefits and Privacy
Concerns ofMunicipal Broadband Applications, ii N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL. 467
(2oo8).
76 Vos, supra note 73.
77 Clancy, supra note 59.
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addition, economic benefits exist: long term city costs have been
reduced, effectively, by fifty million over the next twenty years.78
With concerted effort and a little luck, Corpus Christi was able to
take its internal network and transform it into a thriving wireless
network for public use. The city takes its public interest obligation
seriously. Through the creation of ConnectCC, and the city's emphasis
on public safety (e.g., wireless video cameras) and government
efficiencies (e.g., wireless meter reading), it is providing a true public
benefit for its citizens.
C. Santa Monica, Cal.
Santa Monica provides high-speed fiber to government agencies
and businesses (not directly to residents) at up to ten gigabits-per-
second through its provider, City Net.79 In 2002, the city originally
invested $530,000 in the local TV operator to overbuild (meaning
build a second network in the same area) for municipal use (an I-net).
The resulting network housed more capacity than the city needed in
the near-term.so Therefore, once the city determined its needs, it was
able to lease its leftover "dark" capacity-unused capacity81-to large
companies that wanted a dedicated connection to the backbone.
Getting to that point took careful planning and strategy.
Confronted with high broadband costs, as well as increasingly
expensive private subscription rates, the city decided to provide its
own network. The program went through extensive planning that
78 See Tropos Case Study: Corpus Christi Pioneers Metro-Wide Wi-Fi Mesh, TROPOS 4
(July 2007), http://www.tropos.com/pdf/case-studies/tropos-casestudy-corpus
christi.pdf ("Overall, the city spent around $20 million for their [Automatic Meter
Readers] and Wi-Fi network which provides a $30 million savings over the estimated $50
million that they would have spent over the next 20 years with an AMR system.")
(emphasis added).
79 Christopher Mitchell, More Details from the Incredible Santa Monica City Net,
MUNINETWORKS (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.muninetworks.org/content/more-details-
incredible-santa-monica-city-net.
80 Masha Zager, Santa Monica City Net: How to Grow a Network, BROADBAND
PROPERTIES MAG. 44 (May/June 2011,), available at http://www.bbpmag.com/2011mags/
mayjuneii/BBCMayJun11_SantaMonica.pdf.
81 Rebecca Kheel, What Lies Beneath, SANTA MONICA DAILY PRESS (July 26, 20o), http://
www.smdp.com/Articles-c-2010-07-25-70024.113116-What-lies-beneath.html. Used fiber
is "lit." Id.
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began soon after the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.82
City officials discussed with incumbents whether they would reduce
prices, or, if not, whether the city would build the network itself.83
Falling short of a satisfactory resolution, Jory Wolf, Santa Monica's
Chief Information Officer, began vigorously pursuing a municipal
high-speed network, to include "video, data, voice, cable, wireless and
other services."8 4
A piecemeal build-out approach worked well for Santa Monica.
After the city built the I-net, it immediately noticed annual savings of
$400,ooo. The new system increased government efficiency by
allowing for remote tasks such as "traffic surveillance, traffic signal
synchronization, real-time parking advisories, real-time mass transit
signs and security cameras."8 5 Within a few years, the savings grew to
$500,000 per year.8 6 The city then reinvested $500,000 into building
its own ten gigabit-per-second fiber-optic network.7 Because the city
owned the fiber and had built more capacity than it needed, it began
leasing its dark fiber. This created a new revenue stream for the city
while giving local businesses more, and cheaper, options. 8
Before the municipal network was implemented, incumbent cable
operators served businesses in most areas in Santa Monica. However,
businesses could not find ultra-high-speed Internet access (loo
megabits-per-second) with a private provider offered below $3,500
per month-a price that further inspired the city to invest in its own
82 Zager, supra note 80, at 44.
83 Id.; Ryan Singel, Hey, Google Fiber Losers: Built It Yourselves, WIRED (Apr. 8, 2010),
http://wwwv.wired.com/epicenter/2o10/04/google-fiber-losers ("Santa Monica avoided a
fight with Verizon ... by going to the company and asking if they would build such a
network - and then when they said no, built it themselves.").
84 Zager, supra note 80, at 44.
8a Id. at 45.
86 Id.
87 Santa Monica Application for 2011 Better Government Competition, PIONEER
MUNISHARE, 3, http://www.pioneermunishare.org/download.php?download-file=
all-reports/2011o8_17 11_43_21-73-Santa%2oMonica%20City%20Net-
%2o(Gary%20Carter).doc [hereinafter SM Application] (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (on file
with author).
88 Id. Apparently the plan to lease dark fiber was pushed forward six months to a year
because Google inquired about leasing some of Santa Monica's dark fiber in 2006. Kheel,
supra note 81.
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network and provide access at a lower rate. The resulting program was
extraordinarily successful. The city financed the construction of a fiber
backbone, but the backbone was connected only to municipal
premises, not to local businesses. In order for local businesses to join,
the businesses needed to connect to that backbone. For the same
reason infrastructure build-out is expensive for private companies, the
build-out costs for this expansion would also be significant for the
city. Santa Monica's solution was to make the initial build-out
investment to the local business premises, but it also required the
newly connected business to reimburse the city those costs. 89 In effect,
the city gets no-cost (to it) build-out of the network. Businesses can
afford to reimburse the city because the businesses save 67.6 percent
on their broadband rates, a savings of approximately $3,380 per
month.90 These lower monthly costs provide enough long-term cost-
savings to justify the high up-front build-out costs. 91
Revenues from leasing dark fiber total approximately $68o,ooo
per year.9 2 While this is not insignificant revenue, leasing dark fiber
was never intended to be a substantial source of income. Neighbor
Burbank, California also leases its dark fiber, and receives an
approximated $1 million per year in revenue. 93Nevertheless, the
revenue from leasing dark fiber fully funds network operations and
maintenance and supports many free Wi-Fi hot spots throughout the
city.94 In the future, the city plans to expand even more; currently, the
network represents about sixty percent of the total planned area.95
89 Zager, supra note 80, at 45. The city has a "revolving capital improvement project
account" of $190,000. That account provides the build-out investment that is then
reimbursed by the purchasing business. Id. at 46.
90 SM Application, supra note 87, at 4. It should be noted that businesses usually pay high
up-front costs for high-speed connections regardless of provider, because businesses
usually require much more capacity than the average individual.
91 Zager, supra note 80, at 45.
92 SM Application, supra note 87, at 4.
93 Kheel, supra note 81.
94 SM Application, supra note 87, at 4. See also Zager, supra note 80, at 46 (there are Wi-
Fi hotspots in parks, beaches, libraries, public buildings, and other open-space areas). Each
day about 2000 of Santa Monica's 87,000 residents use the twenty-seven hot spots. Id.
95 Zager, supra note 80, at 46.
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Word-of-mouth advertising originally drove new subscriptions.
Today, the city markets its services and its customer retention rate is
one hundred percent. The network itself is open access-available to
competitors. At first, competitors chose not to use the city's network
largely because providers would not be able to control the network.
After seeing the network's success, two providers began offering their
services over the city's network.96
To "assess customer demand for dark fiber leasing," the city
surveyed businesses in Santa Monica in November 2008.97 The
responses indicated that a majority of businesses within two hundred
feet of the city's fiber did not need a ten gigabit-per-second
connection98 In November 2009, the city responded to this problem
by leasing fiber from One Wilshire, a "leading global internet
exchange" in Los Angeles.99 With the less expensive and slower leased
line, smaller businesses in Santa Monica had more appropriate
options from which to choose.100 These city-provided options cost
businesses seventy percent less than the same service with an
incumbent local exchange carrier.o1 Now, smaller businesses were not
priced out of the market.
As a result of Santa Monica's service, competitors were forced to
lower prices. Prices have dropped twenty percent or more for
independent service providers (that is, service providers not using the
city's open access network).1o2 As Wolf stated, "[i]f that's all we had
accomplished, we'd feel that we'd done what we intended."103 In
addition, the low-cost fiber is a draw for businesses when high rents
would otherwise deter them.1o4 High-speed Internet is a selling point
even for the Fairmont Hotel Santa Monica, a luxury hotel providing
loo megabit-per-second connections to its patrons. The hotel sells
96 Id.
97 SM Application, supra note 87, at 7.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Zager, supra note 80, at 45-46.
101 SM Application, supra note 87, at 7.
102 Zager, supra note 8o, at 46.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 47.
38 [Vol. 9:1
NULL
itself as tech-friendly, suitable for technology conventions and media
production-a significant advantage in southern California.105
Unsurprisingly, Santa Monica's network creates social benefits in
addition to the economic benefits outlined above. As discussed, some
hotels provide patrons with high-speed Internet access. For one
particular and common southern California patron type (film
directors), free and fast Internet access is a significant advantage.
Directors, with high-speed access to the Internet, can forward daily
footage to the studio via high-speed access rather than the current
system of physically mailing hard drives via courier or jet. 106
Furthermore, the UCLA Santa Monica Medical Center has
implemented a tele-medicine program similar to the Wellmont Health
System program in Bristol, Va. The medical center connects to its
main site, and "also works with U.S. military services to offer tele-
medicine and virtual surgical procedures to troops stationed
abroad."107 Lastly, the Internet access supports free public Wi-Fi,
improving the quality of life of citizens.1oa This gives free access to
regional college students and professors for educational projects and
research.109 As Wolf said, "[i]t all goes back to the community."110
Like Bristol's OptiNet, City Net has been nationally recognized
with awards from the Public Technology Institute and Harvard's
Kennedy School of Government.' Burbank and Long Beach, Ca., have
launched similar projects. These initiatives could potentially lead to a
regional municipal fiber network, with each community network
connecting to the other for maximum benefit. Other cities seeking to
emulate the program have consulted Santa Monica; though Wolf says
that his program is most likely to succeed "in cities whose municipal
buildings are located reasonably close to one another and that are
within about 50 miles of global data centers with access to competitive
105 Id.
1o6 Id.
107 Id.
108 Christopher Mitchell, Publicly Owned Fiber Connects Hollywood Studios,
MUNINETWORKS (July 28, 20o), http://www.muninetworks.org/content/publicly-owned-
fiber-connects-hollywood-studios.
lo9 SM Application, supra note 87, at 5-6.
110 Kheel, supra note 81.
nM Zager, supra note 8o, at 47.
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broadband options."112 Therefore, before adopting Santa Monica's
plan, a municipality must make the determination that the plan will
work for it. In addition, a city must "forecast savings based upon
implementation of an advanced fiber optic infrastructure, complete[]
a cost/benefit analysis and build[] infrastructure where financials net
zero or a greater return."113 Thus, while Santa Monica had tremendous
success with its plan, it recognizes that there is no one-size-fits-all
approach, and that each municipality must determine which path is
right for it.
III. UNSUCCESSFUL STORIES
A. Philadelphia, Pa.
In 2004, public officials in Philadelphia began planning a city-
wide wireless network. 114 Then-Mayor John Street created the
Wireless Philadelphia Executive Committee to help determine the best
way to deploy the digital infrastructure.115 That committee was "to
develop a public and private partnership to achieve wireless access
throughout the City."116 Despite the public's lack of awareness of the
issues and its lack of information regarding such an ambitious project,
the executive committee held town meetings to give the public a
voice.117 These public meetings led the committee to consider business
models other than the public-private partnership, including private
ownership, public ownership, nonprofit ownership, and the "civic
wireless model."11S After reviewing all of the business models, the
112 Id.
113 SM Application, supra note 87, at 2-3.
114 Joshua Breitbart, The Philadelphia Story: Learning from a Municipal Wireless Pioneer,
NEW AM. FOUND. 9 (Dec. 11, 2007), http://www.newamerica.net/files/NAFPhilWireless
report.pdf.
i1 Id. at 10.
n6 Id.
117 Id. at 12, 14. Philadelphians may have suffered as a result of Philadelphia being an early-
adopter; there was not much opportunity for the citizens to learn what was going on or to
learn the full extent of the program. Id.
ii8 Id. at 13. The Civic Wireless Model "offers free access paid for by the city or a civic
entity." Id.
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executive committee recommended a public-private partnership.119
However, the city ultimately ignored the suggestion. It decided to
pursue a purely private model largely because EarthLink agreed to
build and maintain the network at its own expense. 12 0
EarthLink's generous proposal to build and maintain the network
at its own expense meant the city could use its now-freed funds for
other purposes. The city instituted various digital inclusion initiatives
designed to bridge the digital divide. One of the initiatives was the
"T.E.A.C.H.," or "training, education, access, content, and hardware"
program, which provided free computers, software, and training to
those in need. 121 The program was supposed to provide 10,ooo
bundles (computers, software, training) to low-income families.
However, the program shut down after just 2000 bundles had been
distributed.122
EarthLink's plan was heavily negotiated. Important provisions
included the following: EarthLink paid for and would own the
network for a contract term of ten years; Wireless Philadelphia (the
non-profit in charge of the network) would receive five percent of the
subscriber fee or $1 per subscriber, whichever was greater; EarthLink
would set its own rates (with one exception not germane here); the
network was required to be open to competitors; upload and
download speeds had to be identical at one megabit-per-second;
Wireless Philadelphia was given 25,000 subsidized accounts (at
$9.95/month) to distribute as it saw fit; and EarthLink had specific
rates at which it could use public rights-of-way, or light-posts, to place
wireless routers. 123 By all accounts, this was a restrictive agreement. 12 4
"9 Id. at 13-14.
120 Id. at 21. One cannot fault Philadelphia for accepting the deal; it seemed too good to be
true that Earthlink would build the network entirely on its own dime.
121 Breitbart, supra note 114, at 27-28. That program no longer exists. E-mail from Greg
Goldman, former Executive Director, Digital Impact Group (formerly Wireless
Philadelphia) (Dec. 5, 2011, 9:47 PM) (on file with author).
122 E-mail from Greg Goldman, former Executive Director, Digital Impact Group (formerly
Wireless Philadelphia) (Dec. 5, 2011, 9:47 PM) (on file with author); see Nicole A. Ozer, No
Such Thing as "Free" Internet: Safeguarding Privacy and Free Speech in Municipal
Wireless Systems, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL. 519, 530 (2008) (as of December 2007,
613 bundles had been provided); Wireless Philadelphia Reboots to Bring Wi-Fi to the
Masses, PHIIA. Bus. J. (Jan. 5, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/
philadelphia/stories/2009/o1/o5/story8.html?page= all (as of June 2009, 12oo bundles
had been provided).
123 Breitbart, supra note 114, at 20.
2013] 41
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Each additional restriction made it slightly more difficult for
EarthLink to realize a profit.125
EarthLink and its corporate franchise model did not succeed.
When EarthLink determined that it could no longer return a profit on
the investment, it withdrew from its ten-year contract in 2008.126 At
the time, the project was thirty percent over budget, and a functional
wireless system required double the access points per square mile as
was predicted. 127 In addition, reception was spotty. Problems got
worse as EarthLink laid off more than fifty percent of its workforce
toward the end of the program.12 3 At this point, failure was inevitable.
There is some good news: the network is now owned by the city.
When EarthLink originally exited the market in early 2008, it offered
the network to the city of Philadelphia for free. The city declined
stating on-going maintenance would cost taxpayers too much. 129
Instead, local investors created a for-profit company, Network
Acquisition Company (NAC), which purchased the network for $2
million.130 NAC, and the network, was then purchased by the city of
124 Other private models have failed even without such restrictive agreements, such as
Corpus Christi before the city bought the network back from EarthLink as seen above, or
MetroFi in Portland, Ore. Jacqueline Emigh, In Portland, Oregon, Another City-Wide Wi-
Fi Network Bites the Dust, BETANEWS (Feb. 22, 2oo8), http://betanews.com/20o8/02/
22/in-portland-oregon-another-city-wide-wi-fi-network-bites-the-dust.
125 Mandated open access for a network completely funded by a private company, among
other restrictions, contributed to EarthLink's retreat from the market a few years later.
126 James Valvo, Municipal Broadband's Record ofFailure, AMS. FOR PROSPERITY 2 (Mar.
2009), http://www.americansforprosperity.org/files/MunicipalBroadbandPolicy
Paper.pdf.
127Id. This may have been a result of Philadelphia and EarthLink's overestimation of the
ability of Wi-Fi to be "scaled up"-or rather, the ability of Wi-Fi to travel as far as the city
needed it to. However, it is one of the few technologies not requiring a spectrum license
from the Federal Communications Commission, so it is appealing for use in municipal
networks. E-mail from Christopher Mitchell, Director of Telecommunications as Commons
Initiative, Institute for Local Self-Reliance (Jan. 23, 2012, 12:11 PM) (on file with author).
128 Ben Madgett, Philadelphia: Salvaging the Future ofMunicipal Wireless, REPORT BUYER
(Apr. 3, 2008), http://www.reportbuyer.com/blog/philadelphia-salvaging-the-future-of-
municipal-wireless.
129 Chloe Albanesius, Philadelphia Repurchases City Wi-Fi Network for $2M, PC MAG.
(Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/o,2817,2357395,oo.asp#fbid=2Hw5It-
poKT.
130 Id.
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Philadelphia in late 2009 for $2 million.131 The network still needed a
$17 million investment, which the city has decided to undertake.132
Those improvements are scheduled to be completed by 2013. Once
complete, the network will be for government use only, though the city
plans to expand it for public use in public spaces. 133 The city may
eventually use it to increase revenue by partnering with government
agencies and educational institutions.134 However, the altruistic plan
of maximum digital inclusion is no longer the primary goal.135
Philadelphia's wireless program was described as a failure of
municipal wireless, generally attributable to some inherent inability of
municipalities to provide Internet access.136 Contrary to that assertion,
and as discussed above, municipal wireless networks can be, and often
are, successful.137 This could indicate that Philadelphia's plan was the
cause of the failure, and that private ownership is not sufficient. This
was one particular attempt that did not succeed at first-an attempt
with inadequate planning, too many restrictions on the private entity,
and not enough public understanding or input. Future attempts could
131 Glenn Fleishman, Philadelphia WillBuy Former EarthLink Wi-FiNetwork, WI-FI NET
NEWS (Dec. 16, 2009), http://wifinetnews.com/archives/2009/12/philadelphia-will
buy former earthlink wi-fl network.html.
132 Stephen Lawson, Philadelphia Plans to Buy Its Wi-Fi Network, PCWORLD (Dec. 18,
2009,5:20 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/185ii8/philadelphia-plans-to-buy
its wifi network.html.
133 Id. This would more closely track the successful plans discussed above (first, an I-net,
then expansion).
134 Id. Hopefully Philadelphia will learn from its past mistake and give the private entity a
bit more room to profit. Or, better yet, perhaps it should try a partnership where everyone
benefits in a sustainable way.
13a Id. ("'The digital divide is still real, and it is still something that needs to be addressed.
Perhaps that was not the model to address it, but it makes the cause no less worthy.' [said
Douglas Oliver, city spokesman.]").
136 E.g., Steven Titch, Beyond Municipal Wireless, FOUND. ECON. EDUC., 34 (Oct. 2008),
http://www.fee.org/pdf/the-freeman/o81oFreemanTitch.pdf [hereinafter Titch, Beyond]
(describing EarthLink's announcement to shut down its Philadelphia system as "[t]he final
nail in the municipal wireless coffin"); Ian Urbina, Hopes for Wireless Cities Fade as
Internet Providers Pull out, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/
03/22/us/22wireless.html. But see Craig Settles, Don't Believe the Hype - Few Muni
Broadband Networks Fail, Gov. TECH. (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.govtech.com/wireless/
Few-Muni-Broadband-Networks-Fail.html.
137 Corpus Christi, Minneapolis, Minn., and Fox Valley, Wis., are other examples of
municipal wireless network successes.
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use the same business model and be successful assuming the city and
private entity plan the network adequately. That question, however,
remains unanswered.
B. St. Cloud, Fla.
St. Cloud's municipal wireless network originated as a 2004 pilot
project for a small residential and corporate campus called the
"Stevens Plantation."138 The pilot program, a free wireless Internet
access program, was a success. It was very popular, and people
became immediately dependent on it for Internet access. It even
became a substitute for expensive private Internet access services.
Seeing this success, the city decided to expand the network to cover
the whole city. This led to the March 2006 launch of the city-wide
wireless network called Cyber Spot.139
The city's original $2.5 million investment came from an
Economic Development Fund it was required to use for this project.140
The network was financed by the savings the city would receive by
supplying municipal employees with free wireless Internet access
rather than paying a private Internet provider.141 Its recurring yearly
costs, approximately $6oo,ooo, were paid from tax revenue. 142 Like
other cities, the original goal was to develop the economy.143 However,
other uses became apparent, and St. Cloud extended the free wireless
network to reach all seventeen square miles and 30,ooo residents.144
Early reports indicated that many consumers were disappointed
with the network. St. Cloud installed forty wireless access points per
138 Tropos - Aptilo Case Study - St. Cloud, Florida, TROPOS NETWORKS 1 (May 2008),
http://www.tropos.com/pdf/success-stories/Tropos-Aptiloo508.pdf.
139 Id.
140 St. Cloud Wireless, FREE PRESS, http://web.archive.org/web/200901o6o6O325/http://
www.freepress.net/communityinternet/stcloud (Archive.org screenshot taken Jan. 6,
2009).
141 Id.
142 Tropos Case Study, supra note 138.
143 Will Raymond, Municipal WjiW: St. Cloud on Cloud Nine, CITIZEN WILL (Sept. 11, 2006,
10:51 PM), http://citizenwill.org/2oo6/o9/11/municipal-wifi-st-cloud-on-cloud-nine.
144 Tropos Case Study, supra note 138.
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square mile, the highest density of access points at the time.145 Despite
that, it took only one month for users to complain about
unsatisfactory performance. 146 Some patrons were continuing to
subscribe to their old providers and used the municipal wireless as a
supplement to that access. 147 Even some who could see routers from
their houses were still unable to connect.148 Some thought the service
provided was "so far below the industry standard that citizens would
rather pay the higher price than suffer through government
mismanagement."149 Others said this was an example of "government
incompetence" because of the government's inability to adequately
plan such a complex network.15o
Hewlett-Packard, St. Cloud's customer service provider, told a
different story. HP said out of more than 50,000 user sessions in the
first forty-five days, only 842 help-line calls were received.151 Others
have indicated success as well: "[t]he St. Cloud Cyber Spot has had
tremendous success, attracting 77 percent of its residents to use the
network 6 months after its launch date.... Coverage is so reliable that
some residents have decided to cancel their wired broadband service
145 David Haskin, Who Has the Best Muni Wi-FiNetwork?, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 26,
2007,12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9oo926o/Who-has-the
best muni Wi Fi network.
146 Wi-Fi City Sees Startup Woes, WIRED (Apr. 23, 2006), http://www.wired.com/techbiz/
media/news/20o6/o4/70720 [hereinafter Startup Woes].
147 Id. Supplemental Wi-Fi access is not inherently bad, it can still be a useful service.
However, one testimonial goes as follows, "At first, a desktop computer in Lusardi's house
could use the Wi-Fi network with no problem, but his laptop would only work outdoors.
Even then it was too slow and unreliable, so he kept his $20 per month Sprint DSL service.
Now the desktop doesn't even work, and he's completely abandoned the idea of dropping
his pay service and using the network. 'It's just total frustration,' Lusardi said. 'I'm going to
stay with the DSL and just forget it, because I don't think it's going to work. Very few
people are going to use it, and they're going to say it's underutilized and they're going to
shut it down.'
148 Id.
149 Valvo, supra note 126, at 4.
io Titch, Beyond, supra note 136, at 36.
1al Startup Woes, supra note 146. "Former Mayor Glenn Sangiovanni, who spearheaded the
project, stressed that kinks were still being worked out, but noted that not everyone was
having problems." Id. This may indicate that some of the disappointment was either
anomalous or exaggerated, though the 50,000 sessions metric surely includes repeat log-
ins.
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at home, and are using the Cyber Spot for free."152 Notably, consumer
complaints appear to be based on the assumption that Cyber Spot was
supposed to substitute for wired Internet service. That may not have
been the intention: the city stated from the beginning that if
consumers had problems with indoor Wi-Fi signals, they could
improve the signal strength by purchasing a device that rebroadcasts
signals. 153 This could indicate that the signal was not meant to
substitute for in-home, wired Internet access.
Another indication that disappointment was exaggerated was that
when Cyber Spot was to be shut down for "budget problems," citizens
protested.154 "St. Cloud residents of all stripes" wanted the service to
stay.155 One resident stated, "St. Cloud is not a hick town anymore ....
We're country folks, but we're not backwards. One of the reasons for
that is our Internet."156 The protests worked for a time; the city council
extended the Cyber Spot service for four months until January
2010.157 However, no further extensions were granted. Today, the
system has been suspended indefinitely. 15
In its time, the network provided numerous economic benefits.
Cyber Spot saved the citizens of St. Cloud approximately $3.7 million
per year.159 Building inspectors used the network to deliver building
152 St. Cloud Wireless, supra note 140 (though this overview does not list a publication
date, it must be at least six months after the release of the wireless program, approximately
September 2006).
1a3 Id. These devices reportedly cost $170. Titch, Beyond, supra note 136, at 36. Wi-Fi
signals are not meant to travel long distances, and the town is seventeen square miles.
154 Esme Vos, Angry Residents Prompt St. Cloud, Florida to Keep Free WiFi Service
Running, MUNIWIRELESS (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.muniwireless.com/2009/10/o2/st-
cloud-keeps-wifi-running-for-4-months [hereinafter Vos, Angry Residents].
155 Glenn Gleishman, Heartbreak ofHeartland, Again, WI-FI NET NEWS (Dec. 28, 2009),
http://wifinetnews.com/archives/2009/12/heartbreak-of heartland-again.html.
156 Vos, Angry Residents, supra note 154 (quoting resident Keith Harris) (internal
quotation marks omitted). "Other residents argued that they depended on the service ... to
order medications, look for employment, pay bills or attend virtual high-school and college
classes. All argued that they couldn't afford to pay for an Internet connection." Id.
157 Id.
158 Cyber Spot, CITY OF ST. CLOUD, http://www.stcloud.org/index.aspx?nid=402 (last
visited Jan. 11, 2013).
159 Esme Vos, One Year Later, St. Cloud Citywide Wi-Fi Network Shows Impressive
Results, MUNIWIRELESS (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.muniwireless.com/2007/03/o6/one-
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codes and work orders to laptops in the field, creating a more efficient
government. 160 The network also provided non-economic benefits.
The Mayor of St. Cloud stated that many of those who used the free
wireless service were those who otherwise were not able to access the
Internet.161 In addition, the network allowed for ambulance telemetry
and enhanced first responder support.162
Despite the numerous complaints detailed above, usage statistics
after the first year were impressive. The network reached seventy-
seven percent of the population, users logged 4,627,381 hours, and the
average session length was 3.5 hours. The average monthly fee
previously paid, and thus saved if the user dropped its service, was
$36.47 per month.16 3
Of these five case studies, St. Cloud is the only network not
currently functioning or with plans to function in the near future. If
St. Cloud were to bring the program back, it would have to respond to
its citizens' complaints and potentially upgrade the network for it to
have the intended benefits. Otherwise, it would receive similar
backlash. Perhaps responding to those complaints would be too costly
or might preclude the city from reviving the system. Perhaps it would
inspire the city to sell the existing network to a private company from
which it might be able to extract profit. In any event, it currently looks
as if the city is unlikely to revive the program as in Philadelphia.164
year-later-st-cloud-citywide-wi-fi-network-shows-impressive-results [hereinafter Vos, One
Year Later].
160 Tropos Case Study, supra note 138, at 1-2.
16, Esme Vos, St. Cloud Shuts down Free Citywide WiFi Service, MUNIWIRELESS (Sept. 28,
2oo9), http://www.muniwireless.com/2009/o9/28/st-cloud-shuts-down-free-citywide-
wifi-service.
162 Raymond, supra note 143.
163 Vos, One Year Later, supra note 159.
1
6
4 The City of St. Cloud intended to include a referendum in November 2010 to potentially
revive the program. But the St. Cloud website states Cyber Spot is still in suspension. Cyber
Spot, supra note 158; see Press Release, City of St. Cloud, St. Cloud Residents to Vote on
Cyber Spot in November, Mar. 26, 2010, available at http://www.stcloud.org/documents/
18/184/03_032610_Nov ballot to includeCyberSpot.pdf.
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IV. HISTORY'S GUIDE
These case studies can provide guidance for municipalities
considering providing their own broadband service. As mentioned
above, the decision of whether to provide broadband is necessarily an
intricate and fact-specific determination for each municipality. For a
municipality to provide broadband there must be some persuasive
reason to do so. Perhaps private actors either do not exist; or they do
exist, but provide poor service. Maybe there is a significant digital
divide in the community that the private entity has been unable to
bridge, or the area is in need of the social and economic benefits that
municipal broadband networks provide.165 In any case, planning is an
essential element to constructing a successful municipal network.166
These case studies offer guidance in two general areas. The first is
what type of business model municipalities should consider. The
second is how to bring the network from idea to execution and
beyond. Each will be discussed in turn.
A. The Business Model
The question of what business model to employ is a difficult one.
There are many choices, each with its own benefits and costs. For
instance, the executive committee for Philadelphia reviewed five
potential business models.167 The committee recommended public-
private partnership, but the city chose the purely private business
model because of its own special circumstances. Careful attention
must be paid to the business model, or a city could easily fall into
Philadelphia's position and choose a model that does not actually
work for it.
165 This will require the municipality to determine whether the state has banned or placed
restrictions on the municipal provision of broadband. The Supreme Court allowed states to
ban, or erect barriers to entry for, municipal Internet access in Nixon v. Missouri
Municipal League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004). An excellent aggregation of these state laws is
compiled by the Baller Herbst Law Group, supra note 15; see generally NULL, supra note
17.
166 MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 54 ("The most successful communities have taken more time
in planning and picking their partners ... to ensure they will be able to overcome
challenging obstacles.... Good luck seems to come to those who prepare for it.").
167 See supra note 114, at 14 and accompanying text. It should be noted that business
models come in many different varieties, and the models reviewed by Philadelphia's
executive committee represent only a handful. For more discussions, view Bar & Park,
supra note 5, 113-19.
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The case studies discussed above exemplify two extremes. The first
section will discuss the purely private model, where the network is
wholly owned by the private Internet service provider. The second
section will discuss the purely public model, where the municipality
owns the network in its entirety, whether as a public utility or in some
other fashion. The third section will then discuss the public-private
partnership that was ultimately rejected by Philadelphia, but may be
the best model for some cities.
1. Purely Private Business Models
A purely private municipal Internet access model involves a
private entity paying for and owning the network.163 The private entity
then provides Internet access to citizens on its own terms with
minimal municipal involvement. The city's role primarily consists of
working with the private entity to provide access to its rights-of-way,
including light poles or the right to lay fiber cables under streets or
other property.169 Because the entity will be purchasing these rights-
of-way in bulk, it can potentially receive a favorable rate. The city
could also negotiate lower rates for Internet access for its own
employees, agencies, and other bodies. The Philadelphia plan
essentially embodies the private model.170
This model can be extremely attractive. It relieves the city of the
burden of running the network or investing heavily in infrastructure,
and it allows the municipality to rely on the knowledge, expertise, and
skills of the private provider to run an efficient and functional
network. 171 There is no one-size-fits-all training for municipal
employees for running a network. Engineers in each city must have
skills finely tuned to its own municipality's demands and
168 Breitbart, supra note 114, at 13.
169 Bar & Park, supra note 5, at 117.
170 Breitbart, supra note 114, at 13. Some believed the Philadelphia model was a public-
private partnership. See, e.g., Craig Dingwall, Municipal Broadband: Challenges and
Perspectives, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 67, 94 (2006). Others believed the deal more closely
resembled a purely private model. Breitbart, supra note 114, at 21-22 ("[A]fter [Wireless
Philadelphia] specifically reject[ed] the private franchise option ... Wireless Philadelphia
accepted a proposal for a private franchise [with EarthLink]."). The Philadelphia plan was
unique in that it had contract provisions that looked much like provisions one would see in
a public-private partnership, but Philadelphia had very little involvement in the entire
project. For all intents and purposes, the deal was for private ownership.
171 Techatassanasoontorn, supra note 16, at 584.
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circumstances.172 Private providers could be better at handling that
kind of support role. But this is just one benefit of the purely private
model, where it might otherwise fail because of its shortfalls.
The purely private model is a difficult model with which to succeed
because of the private entity's emphasis on the short-term bottom-
line. While it has the relevant network expertise, one problem is that
the private entity shoulders the entire fiscal burden: the
infrastructure, access to rights-of-way, the equipment, and running
the business. As discussed before, the Internet access market can be
characterized as a natural monopoly, with very high up-front costs. As
a result, investing in infrastructure is an inherently long-term
investment. Early profitability is unlikely, short-term losses should be
expected, and short-term losses are more easily weathered by larger
entities. Philadelphia's story reinforces this point: a medium-sized
Internet provider, such as EarthLink, is less likely to succeed if the
municipality adopts a purely private model. This is also true if the city
partners with a much smaller provider such as Portland, Oregon's
MetroFi.173
EarthLink was a risky choice for Philadelphia; it did not have the
resources that incumbents such as AT&T and Verizon had. 174
Philadelphia could have chosen a larger entity as its partner to gain
the benefits of significant cash flows and ability to handle a significant
amount of risk. It did not, which may have contributed to the failure
of the network. Incumbents tend to like this model because they are
often the only entity that can afford the inherent risks.175 Even when
large incumbents lose the bid, smaller companies will often fail
because they cannot shoulder the burden.176
1721d.
173 Portland's venture with MetroFi failed in 2oo8. Mike Rogoway, MetroFi Sets Date to
Turn offBay Area Networks, OREGONLIVE BLOG (May 29, 2oo8), http://blog.oregonlive.
com/siliconforest/2008/05/metrofi-sets-date to turn off.html.
174 John Blevins, Death of the Revolution: The Legal War on Competitive Broadband
Technologies, 12 YALE J. L. &TECH. 85,115 (2010).
175 Id. at 114. Professor Blevins makes these remarks when discussing the public-private
partnership, but his definition of that term is much closer to what this paper describes as
the purely private model.
176 Id.
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To make matters worse for the private entity, municipal networks
are accompanied by many social benefits-or positive externalities.177
That is part of the reason some municipalities choose to offer it
themselves. By definition, these externalities are not internalized by
the private actor. EarthLink could not monetize or internalize the time
saved and the inconvenience avoided by use of the Wellmont tele-
medicine system, as was made possible by BVU's services. Any private
entity seeking to build a municipal network as a private actor would
have to ignore those benefits. If the provider could internalize those
benefits, its profits would be higher and it could be more successful.
The inability to fully realize these social benefits makes success that
much more difficult. While this may be true for every privately built
network (not just those affiliated with municipalities), municipal
involvement in providing Internet access is arguably supposed to
capitalize on those social, as well as economic, benefits.
The private model offers insignificant advantages over other
models. Perhaps a private entity may benefit through a friendly
relationship to a municipality and therefore receive a discount for
access to rights-of-way. But the model is plagued with the same
problem that confronts rural municipalities: an inability to attract
private entities to build infrastructure. Therefore, an analysis of the
purely public ownership model is required.
2. Purely Public Business Models
A purely public model usually involves a public utility providing
Internet access in a way similar to municipal provision of gas, electric,
and heat, among other things. The public utility would finance the
build-out of the network, as well as run the business of providing
Internet access to customers. This would allow the municipality to
leverage its existing resources in order to acquire subscribers and
provide adequate customer service, support, and billing.178 In other
words, the public provider can use its goodwill to attract a customer
base.179
177 Lawrence Lessig, Why Your Broadband Sucks, WIRED (March 2005), http://www.
wired.com/wired/archive/13.03/view.html?pg=5. Social benefits were discussed in each
section regarding each municipality as well. These often include bridging the digital divide,
increasing quality of life, and providing access to important online functions.
178 Bar & Park, supra note 5, at 115.
179 MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 48.
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Purely public models fared better in these case studies. Bristol,
Corpus Christi, Santa Monica, and now perhaps Philadelphia, were
successful networks that were publicly owned and operated. The
obvious benefit to choosing public ownership is that the municipality
can run the network purely in the public interest.so This may require
educating the public because the public might care more, at first,
about the network turning a profit rather than intangible social
benefits that are difficult to quantify. In addition, if the city has excess
capacity over its existing cables, that capacity could be leased and used
to power a free Wi-Fi network, or it could be used to support an I-net
to increase governmental efficiencies. The detriment is that the
municipality generally must run the business (if state law allows it).
This requires not only an increase in payroll, but also handling any
adverse consequences of disappointing its citizens, as seen in St.
Cloud, Fla. The public model also requires accurate planning for fear
of exacerbating the age-old generality that governments are inefficient
and inadequate service providers.s1
It is a risk for a municipality to run a network. But in some cases
the payoff is worth that risk. In Bristol, Va., next-generation networks
were unlikely to materialize without BVU. Because BVU ran the
business, it employed local citizens who cared on a deeper level about
the functioning of the network and the happiness of its customers.
Santa Monica's ownership of its fiber allowed it to open the network to
competitors, something most telecom and cable companies are not
required to do, which reduced private subscription rates to the benefit
of many citizens. Santa Monica was also able to respond to a specific
need of its community: lower-cost Internet service for local
businesses. When it learned its ten gigabit service was not satisfactory
to many of its smaller local businesses, it found a solution by getting
slower and cheaper connections for them. On the other hand, in the
typical local marketplace where there are perhaps one or two
competitors for wired Internet service, a private entity would be less
likely to find a solution for specific end-users because it simply does
not need to. If that entity is one of the only providers in town, and has
180 There are two main types of public ownership: the "civic wireless" model, and the public
utility model. Breitbart, supra note 114, at 13. This section focuses on the public utility
model.
181 Techatassanasoontorn, supra note 16, at 573. For obvious reasons, those opposed to
municipal broadband (big telecom companies, big cable companies, those that disfavor
government-provided services ideologically) often exaggerate this idea.
[Vol. 9:152
NULL
no tie to its customers other than through a monthly fee, it would
likely be too costly for it to respond to such specific demands.
The public business model has its benefits. Though, from a
municipality's perspective, the risk may simply be too great. If the
network is unsuccessful, the municipality is solely to blame for
substantial sunk costs that are unlikely to be recouped. For an obvious
example, look at St. Cloud, Fla. The network has been turned off since
early 2010. There appears to be no intention to sell the network
infrastructure that was already built (forty wireless access points per
square mile!). Those sunk costs will likely never be recouped short of a
sale or reinvigorating the network itself. For a different approach,
municipalities should look to a public-private partnership.
3. Public-Private Partnership
For purposes of this Article, a public-private partnership exists
when the municipality pays for and builds the infrastructure, and
allows private entities to lease network access from the municipality at
wholesale rates, and then supply Internet access to consumers at retail
rates.13 2 The public-private partnership model is considered a balance
between total municipal control and total private control. On some
level, the model appeals to both sides of the argument because both
the municipality and the private entity "have the potential to profit
greatly from a successful . . . endeavor."13 Some have concluded the
public-private business model is the "most efficient."13 4 It is true that
both municipalities and private entities benefit from this model: the
municipality has ownership and control of the network itself; and
private entities do not have to invest in expensive infrastructure.
Public-private partnerships allow the municipality to design, fund,
and implement the network. The municipality then leverages its
position as owner and operator of the network to negotiate with
private providers.185 In this model, the municipality is not confined to
182 Bar & Park, supra note 5, at 115 (described as municipality as "wholesaler" of capacity);
Breitbart, supra note 114, at 13. Because this is not reminiscent of the deal struck in
Philadelphia, that case study does not provide helpful guidance for this model.
183 Michael J. Santorelli, Rationalizing the Municipal Broadband Debate, 3 ISJPL 43, 70
(2007).
184 Id. at 73.
185 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, MUNICIPAL PROVISION OF WIRELESS
INTERNET 15 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo6/10/
Vo6002imunicipalprovwirelessinternet.pdf.
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one private entity as partner. The municipality could impose an "open
access" requirement allowing the municipality to resell network access
to any number of providers if it wanted.136 Without a restriction on the
number of competitors, the municipality can more easily respond to
local conditions. For instance, if subscription rates are too high, the
municipality can attempt to find more competitors to drive prices
down and perhaps increase revenue to the city. Alternatively, a
municipality could impose frequent contract renegotiations. The idea
would be that the parties respond to the success or failure of particular
provisions or requirements quickly. The end result is a maximally
successful private entity.
The municipality's role is limited after the negotiation stage. Once
the contract is negotiated, the private entity makes the fine-grained
business decisions, including handling the customer support and
billing, and also accepts most of the risk in running the business.
Municipalities benefit from this because they generally do not have
good reputations for business acumen, and many municipalities will
be happy not to have to run the business (all the while earning crucial
revenue). Municipalities also benefit from lower telecommunications
costs.187 However, some municipalities may not like giving up control
over the user experience, and those cities should account for that in
any contract negotiation.
From a theoretical standpoint, this model is very attractive. It is
designed to combine the most favorable aspects from both the purely
public and the purely private models. Municipalities can handle large,
up-front capital investment and can ensure the network runs in the
public interest. If it is an unserved, "Greenfield"SS area, this model
186 Id. However, it is sometimes difficult for municipalities to attract the larger telecoms
and phone companies because they prefer to be monopolies in the areas they serve.
Changing that mentality would be difficult. E-mail from Christopher Mitchell, Director of
Telecommunications as Commons Initiative, Institute for Local Self-Reliance (Jan. 23,
2012, 12:11 PM) (on file with author). As a side note, the municipality could also impose a
network neutrality requirement. See Eric Null, Public Ownership of Networks Can Solve
Broadband Policy Fights, MUNINETWORKS (Feb. 19, 2012), http://www.muninetworks.
org/content/public-ownership-networks-can-solve-broadband-policy-fights.
187 Bar & Park, supra note 5, at 115.
188 "Greenfield" development means the property is undeveloped, and "Brownfield" means
the property has previously been developed. Glossary, BROWNFIELDS CENTER AT THE ENVTL
L. INST., http://www.brownfieldscenter.org/big/glossary.shtml (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).
In the broadband context, I will use "Greenfield" to mean areas where there is no
incumbent broadband provider and no previously existing broadband infrastructure, and
"Brownfield" where there is pre-existing broadband infrastructure.
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can provide the incentive for a private entity to provide Internet
access. Then, the municipality can rely on the private entity's expertise
to provide the Internet service and ensure functionality. Both have the
ability to negotiate at arm's length for a contract that benefits both
sides. The detriments will likely come in the execution. A corporation
is accountable to its shareholders. Thus, it has an incentive, and
perhaps obligation, to increase its revenue. As a private entity loses
the ability to control the network, the entity stands to lose revenue.
For that reason, private providers do not like open access networks,
and incumbents that are accustomed to being monopoly providers will
not welcome such a regime change. Therefore, the municipality may
have to fight vehemently to keep what control it would like to keep.
Alternatively, the private provider may try persuading the
municipality to concede other salient contract terms in exchange for
its increased control. Depending on the concessions, the public may
benefit less than it would if the municipality were to provide Internet
access itself.
It is clear why a municipality would be drawn to this business
model. Municipalities that decide a public-private partnership is best
should be ready for intense contract negotiations. It should determine
what its priorities are for those negotiations and should be reluctant to
concede them. If the private entity requires the municipality to
concede some of its salient contract terms, then the municipality
should try negotiating with other private entities, if the options exist.
Another entity may accept the municipality's original terms, perhaps
resulting in increased public benefit.
B. Growth of the Network
1. "Greenfield" or "Brownfield"?
At the outset of the growth discussion, an important question for
municipalities is whether "Greenfield" or "Brownfield" build-out is
favored or if there are any problems with either. Greenfield
municipalities are confronted with the question of whether high-speed
Internet access should be provided to its citizens in the first instance.
Greenfield municipalities may have a richer incentive-i.e. the only
way for citizens to have access to high-speed Internet is for the
municipality to provide it in some way. Therefore, the municipality
determines whether the city should gain the significant economic and
social benefits that accompany citywide broadband in the first
instance.
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For a Greenfield municipality, it is easier to make the argument
that the municipality should become involved in high-speed network
provision. Fiber optic connections are the wave of the future.189 A
town with no Internet access at all is hurting itself by refusing to get
involved. The Internet is a gateway to democratic participation,
debate, and staying informed in local and national news. Providing
this benefit would be a significant boon for the municipality and its
citizens. It could also streamline many municipal services, as
happened in Corpus Christi, Tex.
"Brownfield" municipalities, such as Philadelphia and Santa
Monica, are confronted with the question of whether current high-
speed Internet access prices are so expensive, or the service so
inadequate, that the municipality should overbuild.19o Certainly in
some cases, like Santa Monica, prices are so high that the municipal
overbuild is worth the investment, which includes vast social benefits
not directly accounted for. If fiber optic connections are the goal, then
a city with merely Digital Subscriber Line or dial-up access to the
Internet is hurting itself as socially and economically beneficial
innovations at the edges require faster connections. A private,
monopolistic or oligopolistic provider is unlikely to make
improvements on its own. That is potentially where the municipality
becomes involved.
Unlike Greenfield build-out, Brownfield requires a much more
intricate determination. It arguably requires a deeper understanding
of the high-speed Internet market within the municipality. For the
municipality to justify becoming involved in the market, its provision
would most likely have to significantly reduce prices in the area or
provide significant economic and social benefits that currently are not
provided. In Santa Monica, local businesses saved 67.6 percent on
their Internet bills by switching to the city's service-obviously, the
municipal network was worth the cost in that area. If the price or
quality reduction were lower, perhaps five or ten percent, the network
may not be worth the time and investment, without significant social
benefits included (for instance, tele-health or distance education
189 YoCHAi BENKLER ET AL., NEXT GENERATION CONNECTIVITY: A REVIEW OF BROADBAND
INTERNET TRANSITIONS AND POLICY FROMAROUND THE WORLD 63 (Feb. 2010); Susan P.
Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 928 (2009).
,o It should be noted that, in some instances, depending on the type of technology used, it
may not even be considered an "overbuild." For instance, for a municipality building a
next-generation fiber optic network where only DSL or cable existed before, that would be
"no more redundant than interstate highways being built over dirt roads." MITCHELL,
supra note 4, at 49.
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programs). This reduction also brought about a twenty percent
reduction in competitor pricing, a significant benefit for many, even
for those businesses that did not make the switch. The network's
social benefits, including tele-medicine and allowing for a more
efficient system for Hollywood directors, further justified the city's
investment. For larger Brownfield municipalities, close attention must
be paid to the economic and social benefits that will actually be
realized to determine whether municipal broadband is appropriate.191
In some cases, it may be prudent to build an I-net in order to save the
municipality itself from exorbitant bulk connection costs of private
providers, and leave residential broadband provision to the private
entities.
A Brownfield municipality is arguably more susceptible to legal
challenge by incumbents as well.192 Private entities feel threatened by
government competition; they often view it as unfair.193 As seen in
Bristol, there are numerous channels through which an incumbent
may challenge the municipality, including at the state legislature
lobbying for restrictive laws, or through the court system enforcing
applicable laws.194 Unless the state legislature comes through like the
Virginia legislature did for Bristol (rather than going in the opposite
direction by erecting more barriers for municipal networks like in
South Carolina),195 any Brownfield municipality will surely encounter
stringent opposition. For that, it should be prepared legally, mentally,
and monetarily.
191 In large metropolitan areas, it is more likely that there is more competition because
there are, in some sense, fewer barriers to entry. Higher population density could increase
revenues and reduce costs, as fewer towers or fewer physical lines need to be built. This
would slightly undermine the municipality's justification for entering the market, as the
social and economic benefits would likely be slight compared to costs.
192 This being said, incumbents do not want to set precedent anywhere in the country that
would threaten their control over the market. Therefore, any municipal network will likely
be attacked, at least in the state legislature.
193 HAROLD FELD ET AL., CONNECTING THE PUBLIC: THE TRUTH ABOUT MUNICIPAL
BROADBAND 4 (April 2005), available at http://www.freepress.net/files/mb-white
paper.pdf. Presumably, some of this unfairness comes from the municipality's ability to
take a loss or cross-subsidize the cost, and thus charge low subscription rates, without the
same repercussions as a private business. This is the basis for many laws that prevent such
behavior by municipalities.
194 See Baller, supra note 15.
195 Cyrus Farivar, South Carolina Passes Bill Against Municipal Broadband, ARS TECHNICA
(June 29, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/o6/south-carolina-passes-bill-
against-municipal-broadband.
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Ultimately, there is no satisfying answer to which type of build-out
is more favorable. Both require high up-front investment in the
network, both can provide significant social benefits, and both require
difficult decisions to be made. These case studies do not provide
effective guidance on this point either; both types are represented, and
both have failed and succeeded. It comes down to the factual
determinations made by the municipality itself. The relative merits of
each type must be deliberated and decided at the outset, and they
must be continually reevaluated as the network plan comes to fruition.
2. First, an I-net
The Bristol and Corpus Christi municipal systems began as
institutional networks, designed purely for the use of the municipality
and its employees. The goal was to improve municipal functions,
reduce costs, and streamline government over the long-term. This
easing-into the market can be a good "beta" test. It allowed the
municipality to determine whether the network was functional and
where problems existed. Once those problems were solved, those
same systems were expanded to provide Internet access to thousands
of wanting citizens and to help bridge the digital divide. If those cities
spent millions of dollars on a citywide high-speed Internet access plan
at the outset, without first testing demand and functionality, it could
have been as disastrous, as in Philadelphia. Instead, the networks
grew slowly in response to industry and consumer demands, and the
growth was dictated by the municipalities' abilities to handle the
larger network. As BVU's Wes Rosenbalm insinuated, creating a
municipal network for the sake of novelty can present problems in
execution.
The establishment of an I-net requires the municipality to ensure
that the I-net will provide benefits to the government that justify the
investment. Given the numerous benefits discussed in these case
studies, it is easy to conclude that I-nets can provide benefits so long
as they are executed correctly. I-nets can streamline government
functions, increase employee safety (no more dog bites), and they can
even allow for telecommuting if certain jobs are conducive to that kind
of work-saving gas costs and the environment. From there, growth of
the network should be naturally determined by industry, consumer
demand, and the municipality's ability to invest.
58 [Vol. 9:1
NULL
V. CONCLUSION
Whether a municipal network will succeed for a particular
municipality is ultimately a determination that should be made on a
case-by-case basis, with all of the facts in front of the decision-maker.
The decision should be methodical: is there a goal, such as bridging
the digital divide, to justify a municipal broadband network? Does the
municipality itself need it? Next, a more fine-grained analysis is
required. What type of business model and financing will work for the
municipality? Does it have surplus cash that it can invest in a
network? Who will provide outside help if needed? In answering all of
these questions, municipalities can learn from previous attempts at
similar networks.
In the coming years, municipalities also will have to consider the
new, highly increased demand for Wi-Fi connections. Whether a
municipal area is adequately covered by a wireless connection is
another issue that should be discussed as part of the planning stage.
Perhaps even a place like New York City, counterintuitively, is not
adequately covered despite numerous potential connections because it
is so densely populated. 196 Again, this is another fact-specific
determination to be made by the municipality in the planning stage. 197
This topic is intricate and requires an in-depth discussion; I will leave
it for a later article to do it justice.198
As this Article highlights, deploying a municipal network is a
significant undertaking. It is technical, political, and complex. But, it
can be done. Philadelphia's municipal broadband plan did not kill the
municipal broadband dream, but ignoring history could.
196 Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Wi-Fi and the Mobile Meltdown, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18,2011,
7:00 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB000142405297020447950457663901o866537594.html.
197 It should be kept in mind that all wireless networks require a wired connection to power
it, and any plans for a Wi-Fi service will require a wire build-out or lease of wired capacity.
198 One such article is Frangois Bar & Namkee Park,Municipal Wi-Fi Networks: The Goals,
Practices, and Policy Implications of the U.S. Case, 61 COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES 107
(2006).
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